The National Wastewater Surveillance System (NWSS): From inception to widespread coverage, 2020-2022, United States.

Wastewater surveillance is a valuable tool that can be used to track infectious diseases in a community. In September 2020, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) established the National Wastewater Surveillance System (NWSS) to coordinate and build the nation's capacity to detect and quantify concentrations of SARS-CoV-2 RNA in U.S. wastewater. This is the first surveillance summary of NWSS, covering September 1, 2020 to December 31, 2022. Through partnerships with state, tribal, local, and territorial health departments, NWSS became a national surveillance platform that can be readily expanded and adapted to meet changing public health needs. Beginning with 209 sampling sites in September 2020, NWSS rapidly expanded to >1500 sites by December 2022, covering ≈47 % of the U.S. population. As of December 2022, >152,000 unique wastewater samples have been collected by NWSS partners, primarily from wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs). WWTPs participating in NWSS tend to be larger than the average U.S. WWTP and serve more populated communities. In December 2022, ≈8 % of the nearly 16,000 U.S. WWTPs were participating in NWSS. NWSS partners used a variety of methods for sampling and testing wastewater samples; however, progress is being made to standardize these methods. In July 2021, NWSS partners started submitting SARS-CoV-2 genome sequencing data to NWSS. In October 2022, NWSS expanded to monkeypox virus testing, with plans to include additional infectious disease targets in the future. Through the rapid implementation and expansion of NWSS, important lessons have been learned. Wastewater surveillance programs should consider both surge and long-term capacities when developing an implementation plan, and early standardization of sampling and testing methods is important to facilitate data comparisons across sites. NWSS has proven to be a flexible and sustainable surveillance system that will continue to be a useful complement to case-based surveillance for guiding public health action.

Detecting Mpox Cases Through Wastewater Surveillance - United States, August 2022-May 2023.

In October 2022, CDC's National Wastewater Surveillance System began routine testing of U.S. wastewater for Monkeypox virus. Wastewater surveillance sensitivity, positive predictive value (PPV), and negative predictive value (NPV) for Monkeypox virus were evaluated by comparing wastewater detections (Monkeypox virus detected versus not detected) to numbers of persons with mpox in a county who were shedding virus. Case ascertainment was assumed to be complete, and persons with mpox were assumed to shed virus for 25 days after symptom onset. A total of 281 cases and 3,492 wastewater samples from 89 sites in 26 counties were included in the analysis. Wastewater surveillance in a single week, from samples representing thousands to millions of persons, had a sensitivity of 32% for detecting one or more persons shedding Monkeypox virus, 49% for detecting five or more persons shedding virus, and 77% for detecting 15 or more persons shedding virus. Weekly PPV and NPV for detecting persons shedding Monkeypox virus in a county were 62% and 80%, respectively. An absence of detections in counties with wastewater surveillance signified a high probability that a large number of cases were not present. Results can help to guide the public health response to Monkeypox virus wastewater detections. A single, isolated detection likely warrants a limited public health response. An absence of detections, in combination with no reported cases, can give public health officials greater confidence that no cases are present. Wastewater surveillance can serve as a useful complement to case surveillance for guiding the public health response to an mpox outbreak.

Social contact patterns among employees in U.S. long-term care facilities during the COVID-19 pandemic, December 2020 to June 2021.

OBJECTIVE: We measured contact patterns using social contact diaries for 157 U.S. long-term care facility employees from December 2020 - June 2021. These data are crucial for analyzing mathematical transmission models and for informing healthcare setting infection control policy. RESULTS: The median number of daily contacts was 10 (IQR 8-11). Household contacts were more likely partially masked than fully masked, more likely to involve physical contact, and longer in duration compared to facility contacts.

Wastewater Surveillance Data as a Complement to Emergency Department Visit Data for Tracking Incidence of Influenza A and Respiratory Syncytial Virus - Wisconsin, August 2022-March 2023.

Wastewater surveillance has been used to assist public health authorities in tracking local transmission of SARS-CoV-2. The usefulness of wastewater surveillance to track community spread of other respiratory pathogens, including influenza virus and respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), is less clear. During the 2022-23 respiratory diseases season, concentrations of influenza A virus and RSV in wastewater samples in three major Wisconsin cities were compared with emergency department (ED) visits associated with these pathogens. In all three cities, higher concentrations of influenza A virus and RSV in wastewater were associated with higher numbers of associated ED visits (Kendall's tau range = 0.50-0.63 for influenza-associated illness and 0.30-0.49 for RSV-associated illness). Detections of both influenza A virus and RSV in wastewater often preceded a rise in associated ED visits for each pathogen, and virus material remained detectable in wastewater for up to 3 months after pathogen-specific ED visits declined. These results demonstrate that wastewater surveillance has the potential to complement conventional methods of influenza and RSV surveillance, detecting viral signals earlier and for a longer duration than do clinical data. Continued use of wastewater surveillance as a supplement to established surveillance systems such as ED visits might improve local understanding and response to seasonal respiratory virus outbreaks.

Factors driving norovirus transmission in long-term care facilities: A case-level analysis of 107 outbreaks.

Norovirus is the most common cause of gastroenteritis outbreaks in long-term care facilities (LTCFs) in the United States, causing a high burden of disease in both residents and staff. Understanding how case symptoms and characteristics contribute to norovirus transmission can lead to more informed outbreak control measures in LTCFs. We examined line lists for 107 norovirus outbreaks that took place in LTCFs in five U.S. states from 2015 to 2019. We estimated the individual effective reproduction number, Ri, to quantify individual case infectiousness and examined the contribution of vomiting, diarrhea, and being a resident (vs. staff) to case infectiousness. The associations between case characteristics and Ri were estimated using a multivariable, log-linear mixed model with inverse variance weighting. We found that cases with vomiting infected 1.28 (95 % CI: 1.11, 1.48) times the number of secondary cases compared to cases without vomiting, and LTCF residents infected 1.31 (95 % CI: 1.15, 1.50) times the number of secondary cases compared to staff. There was no difference in infectiousness between cases with and without diarrhea (1.07; 95 % CI: 0.90, 1.29). This suggests that vomiting, particularly by LTCF residents, was a primary driver of norovirus transmission. These results support control measures that limit exposure to vomitus during norovirus outbreaks in LTCFs.

Declining COVID-19 case-fatality in Georgia, USA, March 2020 to March 2021: a sign of real improvement or a broadening epidemic?

PURPOSE: To examine whether declines in the crude U.S. COVID-19 case fatality ratio is due to improved clinical care and/or other factors. METHODS: We used multivariable logistic regression, adjusted for age and other individual-level characteristics, to examine associations between report month and mortality among confirmed and probable COVID-19 cases and hospitalized cases in Georgia reported March 2, 2020 to March 31, 2021. RESULTS: Compared to August 2020, mortality risk among cases was lowest in November 2020 (OR = 0.84; 95% CI: 0.78-0.91) and remained lower until March 2021 (OR = 0.86; 95% CI: 0.77-0.95). Among hospitalized cases, mortality risk increased in December 2020 (OR = 1.16, 95% CI: 1.07-1.27) and January 2021 (OR = 1.25; 95% CI: 1.14-1.36), before declining until March 2021 (OR = 0.90, 95% CI: 0.78-1.04). CONCLUSIONS: After adjusting for other factors, including the shift to a younger age distribution of cases, we observed lower mortality risk from November 2020 to March 2021 compared to August 2020 among cases. This suggests that improved clinical management may have contributed to lower mortality risk. Among hospitalized cases, mortality risk increased again in December 2020 and January 2021, but then decreased to a risk similar to that among all cases by March 2021.

The Role of Staff in Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in Long-term Care Facilities.

BACKGROUND: US long-term care facilities (LTCFs) have experienced a disproportionate burden of COVID-19 morbidity and mortality. METHODS: We examined SARS-CoV-2 transmission among residents and staff in 60 LTCFs in Fulton County, Georgia, from March 2020 to September 2021. Using the Wallinga-Teunis method to estimate the time-varying reproduction number, R(t), and linear-mixed regression models, we examined associations between case characteristics and R(t). RESULTS: Case counts, outbreak size and duration, and R(t) declined rapidly and remained low after vaccines were first distributed to LTCFs in December 2020, despite increases in community incidence in summer 2021. Staff cases were more infectious than resident cases (average individual reproduction number, R i = 0.6 [95% confidence intervals [CI] = 0.4, 0.7] and 0.1 [95% CI = 0.1, 0.2], respectively). Unvaccinated resident cases were more infectious than vaccinated resident cases (R i = 0.5 [95% CI = 0.4, 0.6] and 0.2 [95% CI = 0.0, 0.8], respectively), but estimates were imprecise. CONCLUSIONS: COVID-19 vaccines slowed transmission and contributed to reduced caseload in LTCFs. However, due to data limitations, we were unable to determine whether breakthrough vaccinated cases were less infectious than unvaccinated cases. Staff cases were six times more infectious than resident cases, consistent with the hypothesis that staff were the primary drivers of SARS-CoV-2 transmission in LTCFs.

Quantifying Risk for SARS-CoV-2 Infection Among Nursing Home Workers for the 2020-2021 Winter Surge of the COVID-19 Pandemic in Georgia, USA.

OBJECTIVES: Estimate incidence of and risks for SARS-CoV-2 infection among nursing home staff in the state of Georgia during the 2020-2021 Winter COVID-19 Surge in the United States. DESIGN: Serial survey and serologic testing at 2 time points with 3-month interval exposure assessment. SETTING AND PARTICIPANTS: Fourteen nursing homes in the state of Georgia; 203 contracted or employed staff members from those 14 participating nursing homes who were seronegative at the first time point and provided a serology specimen at second time point, at which time they reported no COVID-19 vaccination or only very recent vaccination (≤4 weeks). METHODS: Interval infection was defined as seroconversion to antibody presence for both nucleocapsid protein and spike protein. We estimated adjusted odds ratios (aORs) and 95% CIs by job type, using multivariable logistic regression, accounting for community-based risks including interval community incidence and interval change in resident infections per bed. RESULTS: Among 203 eligible staff, 72 (35.5%) had evidence of interval infection. In multivariable analysis among unvaccinated staff, staff SARS-CoV-2 infection-induced seroconversion was significantly higher among nurses and certified nursing assistants accounting for race and interval infection incidence in both the community and facility (aOR 5.3, 95% CI 1.0-28.4). This risk persisted but was attenuated when using the full study cohort including those with very recent vaccination. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS: Midway through the first year of the pandemic, job type continues to be associated with increased risk for infection despite enhanced infection prevention efforts including routine screening of staff. These results suggest that mitigation strategies prior to vaccination did not eliminate occupational risk for infection and emphasize critical need to maximize vaccine utilization to eliminate excess risk among front-line providers.

Occupational risk factors for severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection among healthcare personnel: A 6-month prospective analysis of the COVID-19 Prevention in Emory Healthcare Personnel (COPE) Study.

OBJECTIVES: To determine the incidence of severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection among healthcare personnel (HCP) and to assess occupational risks for SARS-CoV-2 infection. DESIGN: Prospective cohort of healthcare personnel (HCP) followed for 6 months from May through December 2020. SETTING: Large academic healthcare system including 4 hospitals and affiliated clinics in Atlanta, Georgia. PARTICIPANTS: HCP, including those with and without direct patient-care activities, working during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. METHODS: Incident SARS-CoV-2 infections were determined through serologic testing for SARS-CoV-2 IgG at enrollment, at 3 months, and at 6 months. HCP completed monthly surveys regarding occupational activities. Multivariable logistic regression was used to identify occupational factors that increased the risk of SARS-CoV-2 infection. RESULTS: Of the 304 evaluable HCP that were seronegative at enrollment, 26 (9%) seroconverted for SARS-CoV-2 IgG by 6 months. Overall, 219 participants (73%) self-identified as White race, 119 (40%) were nurses, and 121 (40%) worked on inpatient medical-surgical floors. In a multivariable analysis, HCP who identified as Black race were more likely to seroconvert than HCP who identified as White (odds ratio, 4.5; 95% confidence interval, 1.3-14.2). Increased risk for SARS-CoV-2 infection was not identified for any occupational activity, including spending >50% of a typical shift at a patient's bedside, working in a COVID-19 unit, or performing or being present for aerosol-generating procedures (AGPs). CONCLUSIONS: In our study cohort of HCP working in an academic healthcare system, <10% had evidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection over 6 months. No specific occupational activities were identified as increasing risk for SARS-CoV-2 infection.

Associations of infection control measures and norovirus outbreak outcomes in healthcare settings: a systematic review and meta-analysis.

BACKGROUND: Although most norovirus outbreaks in high-income countries occur in healthcare facilities, information on associations between control measures and outbreak outcomes in these settings is lacking. METHODS: We conducted a systematic review/meta-analysis to assess associations between norovirus outbreak control measures and outcomes in hospitals and long-term care facilities (LTCFs), globally. Using regression analyses stratified by setting (hospital/LTCF), we compared durations, attack rates, and case counts for outbreaks in which control measures were reportedly implemented to those in which they were not. RESULTS: We identified 102 papers describing 162 norovirus outbreaks. Control measures were reportedly implemented in 118 (73%) outbreaks and were associated with 0.6 (95% CI: 0.3-1.1) times smaller patient case counts and 0.7 (95% CI: 0.4, 1.0) times shorter durations in hospitals but 1.5 (95% CI: 1.1-2.2), 1.5 (95% CI: 1.0-2.1) and 1.6 (95% CI: 1.0-2.6) times larger overall, resident and staff case counts, respectively, and 1.4 (95% CI: 1.0-2.0) times longer durations in LTCFs. CONCLUSIONS: Reported implementation of control measures was associated with smaller/shorter outbreaks in hospitals but larger/longer outbreaks in LTCFs. Control measures were likely implemented in response to larger/longer outbreaks in LTCFs, rather than causing them. Prospective observational or intervention studies are needed to determine effectiveness.

Occupational risk factors for severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection among healthcare personnel: A cross-sectional analysis of subjects enrolled in the COVID-19 Prevention in Emory Healthcare Personnel (COPE) study.

Among 353 healthcare personnel in a longitudinal cohort in 4 hospitals in Atlanta, Georgia (May-June 2020), 23 (6.5%) had severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) antibodies. Spending >50% of a typical shift at the bedside (OR, 3.4; 95% CI, 1.2-10.5) and black race (OR, 8.4; 95% CI, 2.7-27.4) were associated with SARS-CoV-2 seropositivity.

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 Transmission in Georgia, USA, February 1-July 13, 2020.

The serial interval and effective reproduction number for coronavirus disease (COVID-19) are heterogenous, varying by demographic characteristics, region, and period. During February 1-July 13, 2020, we identified 4,080 transmission pairs in Georgia, USA, by using contact tracing information from COVID-19 cases reported to the Georgia Department of Public Health. We examined how various transmission characteristics were affected by symptoms, demographics, and period (during shelter-in-place and after subsequent reopening) and estimated the time course of reproduction numbers for all 159 Georgia counties. Transmission varied by time and place but also by persons' sex and race. The mean serial interval decreased from 5.97 days in February-April to 4.40 days in June-July. Younger adults (20-50 years of age) were involved in most transmission events occurring during or after reopening. The shelter-in-place period was not long enough to prevent sustained virus transmission in densely populated urban areas connected by major transportation links.

Risk factors for severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) seropositivity among nursing home staff.

Objectives: To estimate prior severe acute respiratory coronavirus virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection among skilled nursing facility (SNF) staff in the state of Georgia and to identify risk factors for seropositivity as of fall 2020. Design: Baseline survey and seroprevalence of the ongoing longitudinal Coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) Prevention in Nursing Homes study. Setting: The study included 14 SNFs in the state of Georgia. Participants: In total, 792 SNF staff employed or contracted with participating SNFs were included in this study. The analysis included 749 participants with SARS-CoV-2 serostatus results who provided age, sex, and complete survey information. Methods: We estimated unadjusted odds ratios (ORs) and 95% confidence intervals (95% CIs) for potential risk factors and SARS-CoV-2 serostatus. We estimated adjusted ORs using a logistic regression model including age, sex, community case rate, SNF resident infection rate, working at other facilities, and job role. Results: Staff working in high-infection SNFs were twice as likely (unadjusted OR, 2.08; 95% CI, 1.45-3.00) to be seropositive as those in low-infection SNFs. Certified nursing assistants and nurses were 3 times more likely to be seropositive than administrative, pharmacy, or nonresident care staff: unadjusted OR, 2.93 (95% CI, 1.58-5.78) and unadjusted OR, 3.08 (95% CI, 1.66-6.07). Logistic regression yielded similar adjusted ORs. Conclusions: Working at high-infection SNFs was a risk factor for SARS-CoV-2 seropositivity. Even after accounting for resident infections, certified nursing assistants and nurses had a 3-fold higher risk of SARS-CoV-2 seropositivity than nonclinical staff. This knowledge can guide prioritized implementation of safer ways for caregivers to provide necessary care to SNF residents.

Quantifying the roles of vomiting, diarrhea, and residents vs. staff in norovirus transmission in U.S. nursing home outbreaks.

The role of individual case characteristics, such as symptoms or demographics, in norovirus transmissibility is poorly understood. Six nursing home norovirus outbreaks occurring in South Carolina, U.S. from 2014 to 2016 were examined. We aimed to quantify the contribution of symptoms and other case characteristics in norovirus transmission using the reproduction number (REi) as an estimate of individual case infectivity and to examine how transmission changes over the course of an outbreak. Individual estimates of REi were calculated using a maximum likelihood procedure to infer the average number of secondary cases generated by each case. The associations between case characteristics and REi were estimated using a weighted multivariate mixed linear model. Outbreaks began with one to three index case(s) with large estimated REi's (range: 1.48 to 8.70) relative to subsequent cases. Of the 209 cases, 155 (75%) vomited, 164 (79%) had diarrhea, and 158 (76%) were nursing home residents (vs. staff). Cases who vomited infected 2.12 (95% CI: 1.68, 2.68) times the number of individuals as non-vomiters, cases with diarrhea infected 1.39 (95% CI: 1.03, 1.87) times the number of individuals as cases without diarrhea, and resident-cases infected 1.53 (95% CI: 1.15, 2.02) times the number of individuals as staff-cases. Index cases tended to be residents (vs. staff) who vomited and infected considerably more secondary cases compared to non-index cases. Results suggest that individuals, particularly residents, who vomit are more infectious and tend to drive norovirus transmission in U.S. nursing home norovirus outbreaks. While diarrhea also plays a role in norovirus transmission, it is to a lesser degree than vomiting in these settings. Results lend support for prevention and control measures that focus on cases who vomit, particularly if those cases are residents.

Understanding the Importance of Contact Heterogeneity and Variable Infectiousness in the Dynamics of a Large Norovirus Outbreak.

BACKGROUND: Large norovirus (NoV) outbreaks are explosive in nature and vary widely in final size and duration, suggesting that superspreading combined with heterogeneous contact may explain these dynamics. Modeling tools that can capture heterogeneity in infectiousness and contact are important for NoV outbreak prevention and control, yet they remain limited. METHODS: Data from a large NoV outbreak at a Dutch scout jamboree, which resulted in illness among 326 (of 4500 total) individuals from 7 separate camps, were used to examine the contributions of individual variation in infectiousness and clustered contact patterns to the transmission dynamics. A Bayesian hierarchical model of heterogeneous, clustered outbreak transmission was applied to represent (1) between-individual heterogeneity in infectiousness and (2) heterogeneous patterns of contact. RESULTS: We found wide heterogeneity in infectiousness across individuals, suggestive of superspreading. Nearly 50% of individual infectiousness was concentrated in the individual's subcamp of residence, with the remainder distributed over other subcamps. This suggests a source-and-sink dynamic in which subcamps with greater average infectiousness fed cases to those with a lower transmission rate. Although the per capita transmission rate within camps was significantly greater than that between camps, the large pool of susceptible individuals across camps enabled similar numbers of secondary cases generated between versus within camps. CONCLUSIONS: The consideration of clustered transmission and heterogeneous infectiousness is important for understanding NoV transmission dynamics. Models including these mechanisms may be useful for providing early warning and guiding outbreak response.